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)
)
)
)
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)
)

DOCKET NO. 39406·2011
Canyon County Case No. CV 2001-7777

)

Defendant/Respondent.

)
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I.
INTRODUCTION

The narrow issue addressed in this Brief in Support ofAppellants' Petition for Rehearing
is the meaning of the name "DeGroot Dairy" as it appears in the written construction bid
between Defendant Standley Trenching,

Inc.

(hereinafter,

"Standley") and Beltman

Construction, Inc. (hereinafter, "Beltman,,).l Because Charles DeGroot and DeGroot Farms,
LLC (hereinafter, "DeGroot"), Standley, and this Court in its Memorandum Decision each assert
a different, and potentially reasonable, interpretation of the term, the contract for the construction
of the DeGroot Dairy manure handling system must be found to be ambiguous. As a result, the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement and construction of the DeGroot
Dairy manure handling system must be examined. When viewed in a light most favorable to
DeGroot, a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intention to benefit DeGroot exists.
Therefore, the dismissal of DeGroot's claims on summary judgment must be reversed and the
case remanded for a trial on the merits.
II.
ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, this
Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and

1 Although the bid itself does not list "Beltman Construction, Inc." nor is it signed by "Standley Trenching, Inc."
Rather, the bid references "Stan Beltman" and is signed by "Kurt Standley." R.Vol. IV, p. 604.
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whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 When assessing a motion
for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the
nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
party resisting the motion. 3
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. 4 The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the
nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 5 Such an absence of evidence may be
established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a
review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is
lacking. 6 Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the
party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits,
that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so
under I.R.C.P. 56(f).7
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c),
which is identical in all relevant aspects to LR.C.P. 56(c), stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct.App. 1986).
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); Sanders v. KunaJoint School
Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App. 1994).
4 Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984,988 (Ct.App. 1992).
5 Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311,882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.App. 1994).
6 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App. 2000).
7 Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874, 876 P.2d at 156.
2
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fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact,"
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 8
The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in Idaho. 9
B. Because the bid contract is susceptible to differing reasonable interpretations, a
question of fact as to whom the contract was intended to benefit exists.
From the outset of this case, DeGroot has taken the position that the reference to
"DeGroot Dairy" on the bid contract references DeGroot as an intended beneficiary of the
contract. This is clearly a reasonable interpretation based on the plain language of the bid
contract

even without analyzing the surrounding circumstances of the case. In addition to the

name "DeGroot Dairy," the bid contains the names Stan Beltman and Kurt Standley. IO Given the
informal nature of the bid contract, the inclusion of "DeGroot Dairy" as a party to the agreement
certainly raises a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the intent of the parties.
The common phrase of 'who,' 'what,' 'when,' 'where,' or 'why' provides an apt
framework to analyze the use of the name "DeGroot Dairy" in the written bid contract. As stated
above, using DeGroot's analysis, the name "DeGroort Dairy" in the bid contract refers to

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53,91 L.Ed.2d 265,273-74 (1986) (citations
omitted).
9 Dunnick, 126 Idaho at 312,882 P.2d at 479.
10 R. Vol. IV, p. 604.

8
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DeGroot as an intended beneficiary of the contract. In other words, "DeGroot Dairy" refers to
the "who."
In its briefmg, Standley argues that the written bid contract is not ambiguous and does not
show any intent to benefit DeGroot. 11 Standley does not dispute that the bid contract contains the
name "DeGroot Dairy.,,12 Standley argues that the name "DeGroot Dairy" is "a reference to the
project name.,,13 In other words, using the 'who,' 'what,' 'when,' 'where,' or 'why' framework,
Standley argues that the name "DeGroot Dairy" signifies the 'what.'
The Court, however, adopted neither DeGroot's nor Standley's interpretation of that term
and found that the name "DeGroot Dairy" in the bid contract referenced the "where." This Court
stated:
The single appearance of "DeGroot" in the bid contract does not reflect an
express intent to benefit DeGroot; rather, it merely reflects where the work
is to be done. There is no other language in the contract reflecting an
intent to benefit DeGroot. 14
Because of this conclusion, the Court found the contract to be unambiguous and declined
to examine the surrounding circumstances leading to formation. 15
The problem with the Court's finding that "DeGroot Dairy" references "where" the work
is to be done is this: At the time of the bid contract, DeGroot was operating a dairy in Sunnyside,
Washington that consisted of 223 acres and 1,250 cows. 16 If "DeGroot Dairy" is found to refer to

11 Respondent's
12/d.

Brief, pp. 9-10.

Id.
Docket No. 39406, p. 6 (emphasis added).
15 Jd., p. 7.
16 R. Vol. I, p. 98, Deposition of Charles DeGroot, p. 34,
!3

14

n. 4-12; p. 36, n. 6-17.
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the "where," it is still ambiguous because there is no address or further description to indicate
which "DeGroot Dairy" was being referenced without taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the construction of the DeGroot dairy in Idaho and the events leading to the
formation of the contract with Standley. Further, it would be inappropriate for the Court to
resolve the factual dispute surrounding the meaning of "DeGroot Dairy" on the bid given the
standard of review utilized at summary judgment.
Ultimately, this Court's decision overlooks the fact that DeGroot, Standley, and the Court
each asserted what is arguably a reasonable interpretation of the name "DeGroot Dairy" as it
appears in the written bid contract. Because of the three conflicting interpretations of the
significance or meaning of "DeGroot Dairy" on the bid, it must be found that the bid contract
itself is ambiguous. This necessarily leads to a question of fact over the interpretation of the
contract. 17 At summary judgment,' it is axiomatic that all inferences must be drawn in favor of the
non-moving party. As such, DeGroot is entitled to the inference that the reference to "DeGroot
Dairy" in the bid contract references the "who" that would benefit from contract.
Moreover, the reference to "DeGroot Dairy" is even more significant than the reference
to the third-party in the contract at issue in the Blickenstaff case referenced in this Court's
decision. As this Court noted in Blickenstaff, the contract in that case contained a future
obligations clause that stated "the funds to pay [third-party] M & D Trust for the purchase of its
twenty seven (27%) percent interest" would be personally guaranteed. 18 This Court correctly
found that clause "does not specifically guarantee" financing would be obtained. Id. The
17

18

City a/Idaho Falls v. Home Indemnity, 126 Idaho 604,888 P.2d 383 (1995).
Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 579,97 P.3d 439, 446 (2004).
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reference to "DeGroot Dairy" in the bid contract, however, is much more significant as the
reference shows the parties intended to benefit DeGroot in the construction of the dairy. In fact,
the bid contract evidences the obligation of the parties to construct the very dairy DeGroot
ordered.
Because the ambiguity created by the reference to "DeGroot Dairy" in the bid raises an
issue of material fact regarding the intent of the parties, all of the surrounding circumstances
leading to contract formation must be taken into account. 19
Here, the surrounding circumstances only strengthen DeGroot's argument that it was an
intended beneficiary of the contract to construct the dairy. Not only was DeGroot named in the
bid contract, but also named as a customer on Standley'S invoices and Houle's packing slips.2o
Standley attended the Tolero Agricultural Show in California in February 1999 where Standley
marketed Houle equipment to Charles DeGroot and spoke with him specifically about submitting
a bid for installation of the manure handling system. 21 After that meeting, Standley bid for the
installation of the manure handling system for DeGroot. 22 Standley specifically designed the
manure handling system for DeGroot by selecting the motor, the motor specifications including
horsepower and voltage, the four-inch pump, pipe size, valves, as well as specifications for the
flush system. 23 At the time the contract was entered into, Standley knew that DeGroot would be

Stewart v. Arrington Construction Co., 92 Idaho 526,532,446 P.2d 895 (1968).
R. Vol. IV, p. 703; p. 704; p. 706; p. 707, p. 709; p. 710; p. 712; p. 713; p. 714; p. 717; p. 718; pp. 720-24.
21 !d., p.674.
22 !d., pp. 604-07.
23 !d., pp. 674-76; and R. Vol. III, pp. 461-66.
19

20
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paying for the construction of the dairy, including installation of the manure handling system. 24
Clearly, Standley knew that DeGroot would be paying for the construction of the dairy, including
installation of the manure handling system. Thus, installation of the manure handling system
would inure to the benefit of DeGroot upon completion. Furthermore, DeGroot selected Standley
to perform the work and Beltman had no say or control over this decision?5
These circumstances surrounding the bid contract must be examined because of the
ambiguity in the bid contract outlined above. Further, these facts must be viewed in a light most
favorable to DeGroot. When done so, it is clear that there is an issue of fact with respect to
whom the contract for the construction of the DeGroot Dairy was to benefit.
III.
CONCLUSION

Three differing, and potentially reasonable, interpretations have been provided of the
name DeGroot Dairy in the bid contract. As a result, and after considering the circumstances
surrounding the construction of the DeGroot Dairy, a genuine issue of material fact exists that
prevents determination of the case on a motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it is
respectfully requested that this Court reverse the district court and remand for a trial on the
merits of the case.

24/d.,pp. 674;p.703; p. 704;p. 706;p. 707;p. 709;p. 710;p. 712;p. 713;p. 714;p. 717;p. 718;p. 720;p. 721;p.
722;p. 723;p. 724.
25 R. Vol. III, p. 446.
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DATEDthis

tL.

018

day of April, 2014.
DINIUS LAW
By: _ _-f-_ _ _ _ _--'....._ _
KevinE.
Michael . Hanby II
Attorneys for Appellants
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